Rethinking Social Security Claiming in a 401(k) World by Mahaney, James I. & Carlson, Peter C.
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Wharton Pension Research Council Working 
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council 
1-2008 
Rethinking Social Security Claiming in a 401(k) World 
James I. Mahaney 
Peter C. Carlson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Mahaney, James I. and Carlson, Peter C., "Rethinking Social Security Claiming in a 401(k) World" (2008). 
Wharton Pension Research Council Working Papers. 555. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/555 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2008 publication: Recalibrating Retirement 
Spending and Saving. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/555 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Rethinking Social Security Claiming in a 401(k) World 
Abstract 
This chapter argues that previous research on Social Security take-up alternatives has failed to recognize 
critical factors that greatly impact the discussion on when it is most beneficial to start Social Security 
retirement benefits. We show that the effect of taxes can have a dramatic effect on the financial security 
of retirees, yet the taxation caused by IRA withdrawals and the interaction with Social Security has been 
largely misunderstood. In addition, changes made under the Senior Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act of 
2000 make delaying Social Security for married couples much more favorable. We also show how the 
traditional approach of starting Social Security benefits early and deriving income from stock and bond 
mutual funds is expected to under-perform a strategy that takes income from personal retirement assets 
first and is followed by increased benefits from Social Security. 
Keywords 
social security, retirement, Freedom to Work Act, financial security 
Disciplines 
Economics 
Comments 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2008 publication: Recalibrating 
Retirement Spending and Saving. 
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/555 
978–0–19–954910–8 00-Ameriks-Prelims OUP239-Ameriks (Typeset by SPI, Delhi) iii of xxii February 29, 2008 18:56
Recalibrating
Retirement
Spending and
Saving
EDITED BY
John Ameriks and Olivia S. Mitchell
1
978–0–19–954910–8 00-Ameriks-Prelims OUP239-Ameriks (Typeset by SPI, Delhi) iv of xxii February 29, 2008 18:56
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide in
Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto
With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and in certain other countries
Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York
© Pension Research Council, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2008
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)
First published 2008
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above
You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Data available
Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India
Printed in Great Britain
on acid-free paper by
Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk
ISBN 978–0–19–954910–8
1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
978–0–19–954910–8 00-Ameriks-Prelims OUP239-Ameriks (Typeset by SPI, Delhi) vii of xxii February 29, 2008 18:56
Contents
List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
Notes on Contributors xiv
List of Abbreviations xx
Part I. Financial and Nonfinancial
Retirement Circumstances
1. Managing Retirement Payouts: Positioning, Investing,
and Spending Assets 3
John Ameriks and Olivia S. Mitchell
2. Is Retirement Being Remade? Developments in
Labor Market Patterns at Older Ages 13
Sewin Chan and Ann Huff Stevens
3. Understanding Consumption in Retirement:
Recent Developments 29
Erik Hurst
4. Net Worth and Housing Equity in Retirement 46
Todd Sinai and Nicholas Souleles
Part II. Retirement Payouts: Balancing
the Objectives
5. The Role of Individual Retirement Accounts in
US Retirement Planning 81
Sarah Holden and Brian Reid
6. Retirement Distributions and the Bequest Motive 112
G. Victor Hallman
7. Rethinking Social Security Claiming in a 401(k) World 141
James I. Mahaney and Peter C. Carlson
978–0–19–954910–8 00-Ameriks-Prelims OUP239-Ameriks (Typeset by SPI, Delhi) viii of xxii February 29, 2008 18:56
viii Contents
8. Regulating Markets for Retirement Payouts: Solvency,
Supervision, and Credibility 168
Phyllis C. Borzi and Martha Priddy Patterson
Part III. Financial Products for Retirement
Risk Management
9. Efficient Retirement Financial Strategies 209
William F. Sharpe, Jason S. Scott, and John G. Watson
10. The Impact of Health Status and Out-of-Pocket Medical
Expenditures on Annuity Valuation 227
Cassio M. Turra and Olivia S. Mitchell
11. Annuity Valuation, Long-Term Care, and Bequest Motives 251
John Ameriks, Andrew Caplin, Steven Laufer,
and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
12. Asset Allocation within Variable Annuities: The
Impact of Guarantees 276
Moshe A. Milevsky and Vladyslav Kyrychenko
13. Tax Issues and Life Care Annuities 295
David Brazell, Jason Brown, and Mark Warshawsky
Index 318
978–0–19–954910–8 07-Ameriks-c07 OUP239-Ameriks (Typeset by SPI, Delhi) 141 of 167 February 29, 2008 17:3
Chapter 7
Rethinking Social Security Claiming
in a 401(k) World
James I. Mahaney and Peter C. Carlson
Much has been written about the value of taking Social Security at an
early age versus delaying the initial start date to a later age. This chapter
explores the premise that the full value of delaying Social Security has not
been properly measured due to a lack of inclusion of the tax benefits,
survivor benefits, projected Cost-of-Living-Adjustments (COLA) benefits,
and spousal benefits available under the Social Security provisions and the
Senior Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act of 2000. Additionally, the lack of
expenses charged to an individual during retirement when higher Social
Security benefits are chosen should be factored into the evaluation, as
the private sector has moved to a ‘Do-It-Yourself’ retirement structure.
Longevity risk, inflation risk, investment risk, and the financial risk caused
by the death of a spouse are all now more widely borne by the individual. In
addition, two emerging risks have been created in the new ‘Do-It-Yourself’
retirement model; expense risk and tax risk. We will discuss these emerging
risks in this chapter and how these emerging risks should be incorporated
into the discussion of the Social Security take-up debate.
As the risks of providing retirement income security have shifted from
the employer to the individual, Social Security take-up decisions should
be more closely analyzed. Fewer individuals are retiring with a traditional
defined benefit pension, and as more retirees choose lump sum options
from defined benefit and defined contribution plans, the importance of
Social Security as part of a retiree’s financial security has greatly increased.
The challenge for US retirees is that they themselves are responsible for
making decisions about how and when to tap their primary retirement
income sources to ensure a secure retirement. Importantly, they appear
to receive incomplete or inaccurate information about how to make a deci-
sion about when to begin Social Security benefits. Intermediate and long-
term interest rates remain below historical averages and many financial
experts are predicting lower returns than historical averages in the near
future in equity and fixed income markets. Accordingly, Social Security
should be more widely recognized as providing valuable financial security
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to the majority of retirees. Traditional ‘break-even’ points should be revis-
ited in light of higher Full Retirement Ages (FRAs), increased longevity,
and the additional risks to retirement security that are now borne more
heavily by individual retirees.
In the future, Social Security benefits will become increasingly valuable
due to their tax-favored status, inflation protection, survivor protection,
and longevity protection. Conversely, IRA income faces investment risk,
expenses, and purchasing power erosion and involves self-insuring at a high
cost. Income from an IRA (or similar individual account products) may
also run out and leave surviving spouses more vulnerable to financial risk.
Essentially, when an individual chooses to delay Social Security versus taking
Social Security early, that individual will be trading higher IRA income for
higher Social Security income over the course of his or her retirement. This
is even more salient with the changes brought on by the Senior Citizens’
Freedom to Work Act of 2000, permitting spouses to initiate spousal bene-
fits even when the primary worker is delaying Social Security benefits. Thus
far this development has not been well understood, appreciated, utilized,
or brought into the traditional break-even analysis.
For simplicity, we will assume in what follows that the primary worker is
male and the spouse is female, although Social Security is not sex specific.
While reading on, one can assume that the spouse with the higher Social
Security benefit is the ‘worker’ and is married to the ‘spouse.’ Benefits
that the spouse collects on her own benefit will be referred to as the
spouse’s ‘worker benefit.’ Benefits she collects on the primary’s record will
be referred to as the ‘spousal benefit.’
Related Literature
The Social Security Administration (SSA) (2005) notes that most individ-
uals still take Social Security retirement benefits early; 72 percent of cur-
rent Social Security retirement income recipients receive reduced benefits
because they started their benefits prior to their FRA. A number of studies
have been completed in recent years regarding Social Security take-up deci-
sions, including Coile and Gruber (2000). Gustman and Steinmeier (2002)
note that many individuals have a strong time preference for receiving
Social Security benefits earlier rather than later, even when lifetime ben-
efits may be higher if claiming of Social Security is delayed. Jennings and
Reichenstein (2001) present a way to estimate the present value of Social
Security benefits both before taxes and after taxes. Their work argues that
after-tax income is what really matters to a retiree and therefore taxation of
retirement income is a critical part of the equation on how to structure a
financial plan to take retirement income.
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We build on the Jennings/Reichenstein approach to show that the tax-
ation of Social Security benefits is largely misunderstood, such that the
after-tax present value of Social Security wealth is in general higher than
what has previously been discussed. In addition, we point out that a new
option to take spousal benefits resulting from the Senior Citizens’ Freedom
to Work Act of 2000 greatly increases the value of delaying Social Security
benefits for a married couple. Changes in the FRA and the value of COLA
benefits to a retiree and worker are presented by Muksian (2004). We
extend this research by incorporating tax considerations and expenses into
the equation of whether a financial planner should recommend that clients
should take Social Security earlier rather than delaying the start of benefits.
Postretirement Risks in a ‘Do-It-Yourself’
Retirement World
Much heard in recent circles is the phrase of an ‘ownership society.’ What
this means is that individuals should decide how and where they should
invest their assets for retirement, including Social Security wealth. Arguably,
in the retirement income world of the private sector, an ownership society
already exists outside of Social Security. That is, the shift from defined
benefit to defined contribution plans allows the retiring individual to retire
with a lump sum that he or she must manage to provide income for as long
as it is needed. Additionally, many employers have switched to cash bal-
ance plans where the majority of workers choose a lump sum distribution.
Finally, many individuals are choosing to retire from traditional defined
benefit plans with a lump sum.
Retirees who leave a qualified retirement plan with a lump sum must now
make sure that needed income flows continue to be generated for the life
of the retiree (and the spouse, if married). Of course, these periods are
unknown and longevity risk may be misunderstood and frequently under-
estimated by retiring individuals. With the lack of annuitization occurring,
many more individuals will likely run out of money due to their longevity
and lack of appropriate planning. McKinsey & Company (2005) reports
that a 65-year-old couple has a greater than 50 percent chance that one
partner will live into their 90s.
Individuals who elect a lump sum option under their retirement plans
also bear investment risk. A majority of individuals retiring from defined
contribution and cash balance plans roll their lump sums into IRAs and
take on investment risk. According to the United States General Account-
ing Office (GAO) (2003), increasing number of individuals are doing the
same under the lump sum option of traditional defined benefit plans.
In such cases, three actions must occur to have a positive outcome.
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First, financial markets must cooperate and provide adequate investment
returns, especially in the critical years immediately preceding and after
retirement. Second, individuals must choose mutual funds which will
perform well (as defined by approaching or exceeding broader market
returns). Finally, individuals must not buy and sell across funds at the
wrong time. As the Dalbar study (2004) shows, the average mutual fund
investor struggles with this, as fear and greed drive behavior. For instance
the S&P 500 produced average annual returns of 12.98 percent from 1984
to 2003, but the average equity fund investor only received a return of
3.51 percent as individuals made poor decisions in timing their mutual
fund purchases and redemptions. For those who chose to time the market
and not invest the same amount each month, the return was actually -3.29
percent. Fixed income returns were even worse, as the average investor
earned only 3.75 percent annually over the 20-year period, compared to the
11.16 percent average annual return of the Long-Term Government Bond
Index.
Furthermore, Bengen (1994) and others argue that the sequence of
investment returns on a lump sum nest egg will dramatically influence
how long the nest egg will provide income. Thus Monte Carlo simulation
techniques have emerged over the last decade to help determine a ‘safe
withdrawal rate.’ Four main criticisms are directed at the use of Monte
Carlo simulations by financial advisers. First, they tend to ignore investment
and advice expenses (Kotlikoff and Burns 2004). Second, they ignore taxes,
which can dramatically impact retirement security, as we will discuss below.
Third, Monte Carlo techniques rely on returns drawn from historical aver-
ages. As investment returns during the early years of retirement dramati-
cally impact the odds of the nest egg surviving for retirements that can last
two or three decades, market returns of the next decade may disappoint
investors and may not be properly positioned with Monte Carlo techniques.
Indeed, Whitehouse (2005) polled some of the most widely recognized
experts in the financial markets who predicted their expected real returns
in the bond and stock markets over the next 40 years. The results, summa-
rized in Table 7-1, do not approach historical averages. A final criticism of
Monte Carlo simulation techniques is that it may be unrealistic to assume
that retirees will have the fortitude to stay invested in equity markets as they
get older and experience market losses.
Inflation risk is very real over retirement periods that can last 25 or more
years. At a 3 percent inflation rate, the value of one dollar falls to $0.48 after
25 years. Historically, US inflation rates have averaged around 3.1 percent.
Whether inflation returns to the hyperinflationary periods of the 1970s and
early 1980s remains to be seen, but there are arguments that the coming
demographics issues and budget deficits will cause higher inflation (Arnott
and Casscells 2003; Kotlikoff and Burns 2004). Both the smaller number
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Table 7-1 Projected Real Rates of Return (%) Anticipated Over the Next
40 Years
Financial Expert Name Organization Stocks (%) Government
Bonds (%)
Corporate
Bonds (%)
William Dudley Goldman Sachs 5.00 2.00 2.50
Jeremy Siegel Wharton 6.00 1.80 2.30
David Rosenberg Merrill Lynch 4.00 3.00 4.00
Ethan Harris Lehman Brothers 4.00 3.50 2.50
Robert Shiller Yale 4.60 2.20 2.70
Joseph LaVorgna Deutsche Bank 6.50 4.00 5.00
Parul Jain Nomura 4.50 3.50 4.00
John Lonski Moody’s 4.00 2.00 3.00
David Malpass Bear Stearns 5.50 3.50 4.25
Jim Glassman J. P. Morgan 4.00 2.50 3.00
Average 4.81 2.80 3.33
Source: Whitehouse (2005); reprinted with permission.
Note: This table indicates that financial experts expect the investment returns of stocks and
bonds to be below historical averages over the next several decades.
of workers left in the workforce and the cost of entitlement programs are
likely to generate higher inflation as the bills become due.
The death of a spouse can cause a significant risk to a widow or wid-
ower as Social Security and pension benefits are significantly reduced. In
addition, women can be much more vulnerable financially with defined
contribution plans, compared to defined benefit plans, since they lose the
protection provided under the defined benefit joint and survivor benefit
option (Munnell and Sass 2005). In addition, women often marry older
men and have longer life expectancies. Furthermore, many widows left the
financial management of retirement to their spouses and, at widowhood
are faced with an overwhelming burden of becoming the investment man-
ager and financial planner with little expertise.
Social Security: Subtle Changes with Major Impact
Changes enacted under Social Security reforms introduced in 1983 are now
phasing in. Importantly, the FRA is now 66 for those who will become eligi-
ble for Social Security over the next several years and it will be going to 67
for the cohort born in 1960 and later. Changes to the FRA have increased
the penalty for taking Social Security early. What was once a 20 percent
decrease in the initial benefit amount when starting Social Security at age
62 is now a 25 percent decrease. The compounding effect of COLAs over
longer life expectancies makes these cuts even deeper in nominal terms as
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the base amount on which COLAs are applied is reduced to a greater extent
than it was when the FRA was 65. In addition, the ‘reward’ for delaying
Social Security past the FRA is now 8 percent per year for those turning
62 in 2005 and later. Again, in nominal terms, the compounding effect of
COLAs throughout retirement adds to the value of delaying compared to
older cohorts who did not have an 8 percent Delayed Retirement Credit
(DRC). It is also unlikely that most individuals realize that even when they
are delaying benefits, they are receiving credit for COLAs during the period
for which they are delaying the start of Social Security.
Consider an example. A worker turning 62 in 2006 has a final salary of
$75,000 making her eligible for a $1,320 a month in Social Security benefits
if she began immediately. If she delays Social Security benefits until age 70,
her benefit will grow to $2,884 more than double what she would collect
at age 62. Not only would she avoid the penalty for taking her benefits
early, but she would also receive increased DRCs and all of the intermittent
projected COLA credits projected in the Social Security Administration’s
trust report as of December 2006. Conversely, if she were to take the $1,320
at age 62, her benefit would grow only to $1,637 by age 70. A much higher
initial benefit will receive much higher absolute dollar increases over time
as the COLA rate is applied. Since these adjustments are compounding, the
cumulative differences can be quite significant. Many individuals are likely
not considering the impact of higher COLAs on a delayed benefit since
the Social Security statement they receive does not illustrate the benefits
of those higher COLAs. For example, in discussions with many retirees,
we found that they use Excel spreadsheets to forecast their own break-even
points and use the Social Security estimated benefits from the annual Social
Security statement. By entering the age 66 amount and age 70 amount
(which are in current dollars) into a formula that measures future dollar
values, the analysis becomes skewed.
Value of COLAs
In nearly all break-even analysis, COLAs are ignored. Muksian (2004)
points out that individuals often fail to account for the value of COLAs.
Although the Social Security system is generally deemed to be actuarially
fair whether taking benefits early, at FRA, or later, the value of COLA
benefits, for those who are fortunate to live a long time (and vulnerable to
inflation and longevity risk), during retirement can be dramatic. Although,
COLAs are not guaranteed by law, we believe that COLAs should be con-
sidered as part of the value proposition of weighing whether to delay Social
Security benefits. Politically, it would be very difficult to cut COLA benefits
for current retirees. Due to much longer life expectancies than in the past,
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the compounding value of COLAs should be considered, especially as these
benefits often can be passed on to a widow at the death of the worker. When
future projected COLAs are factored in, an individual retiring with a first
Social Security check payable in 2006 at age 62 has a crossover age of 78
when comparing to waiting until age 70 to begin initial benefits.
What should be given strong consideration is that the longer the retiree
lives, the higher the return delayed Social Security income provides. Bene-
fits have ‘snowballed’ due to the DRCs and COLAs over many years. Con-
versely, consider that retirees tend to become more conservative with their
own investments as they age and will often struggle to generate sufficient
yield to make the income last for longer periods.
In recent years, inflation protection products such as Treasury Inflation
Protected Securities (TIPs) and Inflation linked bonds (I-Bonds) have been
introduced in the securities market. TIPs are now offered as 5-, 10-, and
20-year bonds but like other bonds, they can lose value in a rising inter-
est rate environment. No matter what inflation rates occur in the future,
COLAs on Social Security retirement benefits provide low-cost inflation
protection that no private product can duplicate without significant cost.
This is primarily due to the expense of providing similar benefits in the
private market. As of this time, we believe only a couple of insurers are
offering CPI-adjusted immediate annuities in the USA to allow individuals
to transfer inflation risk to the insurer.
By taking Social Security early (while not purchasing a private inflation-
adjusted annuity), a retiree ‘chooses’ to retain the inflation risk on the
difference in annual income between the early Social Security amount
chosen and the delayed Social Security income foregone. These dollars
that must be made up are often much less tax efficient as they usually
take the form of IRA withdrawals (taxed as ordinary income). Also, an
individual picks up the expense of managing these dollars in the form
of fees and expenses (commissions, management fees, 12B-1 fees, adviser
charges, etc.).
Survivor Protection
The value of spousal and survivor benefits is another area where Social
Security has not been adequately valued. The importance of spousal
and survivor benefits is further enhanced as the protections provided by
defined benefit retirement plans (with a spouse being forced to waive a
joint and survivor annuity if one is not elected) disappear as defined con-
tribution plans replace defined benefit plans in the private marketplace.
The survivor protection offered under Social Security should be an impor-
tant consideration in deciding when to take Social Security. Whenever a
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member of a married couple dies, the highest individual benefit at that
point in time is the one that continues to be collected by the surviving
spouse. In other words, it does not matter who dies first, the worker or the
spouse, because the lower benefit drops off. Thus, when a primary worker
delays Social Security, the higher delayed benefit plus any compounding
COLAs are passed on to the widow at the worker’s death, if that benefit is
higher than the one she is currently receiving. If an individual still decides
to start Social Security early at age 62, the potential benefit to his widow
is also reduced at the higher penalty incurred with the FRA at 66 and
climbing.
The fact that a higher, delayed retirement benefit can be passed on at
death is often overlooked in break-even calculations. Mirer (1998) and
Rose and Larimore (2001) explore the economic value of collecting Social
Security early versus waiting until FRA, but both studies fail to put an
economic benefit on the survivor benefit that continues on after the death
of the retired worker. According to the Group Annuity Mortality Table of
1994 currently used by many insurers, given a couple who are both 65 years
old, the odds that one of them will reach age 85 are 80 percent; age 90,
57 percent; and age 95, 28 percent. Therefore, there is a good chance
of one of the spouses benefiting from a higher delayed Social Security
amount for many years. Workers who are older than their spouses should
give this special consideration, since their spouses are likely to survive them
by several years.
Since the higher Social Security benefit is passed on to a surviving spouse
at the worker’s death and the lower spousal benefit is dropped, it is often
more beneficial to start the spouse’s benefits earlier (Jennings and Reichen-
stein 2001; Munnell and Soto 2005). Therefore, absent specific individ-
ual health considerations, it will often be beneficial to start the spouse’s
benefits first. To illustrate this, we first review what a spouse is eligible to
receive according to Social Security rules. This provides the basis for our
evaluation. The spouse of a worker is always able to receive whatever benefit
she earns on her own record. In addition, if her own worker’s benefit is
less than half of her husband’s primary worker benefit, then the spouse
is also eligible to collect the excess of half of his primary benefit minus
her own benefit. Both the worker benefit collected on her own record and
the spousal benefit collected on his record receive reductions for taking the
benefit before FRA. The spousal benefit reductions are greater than worker
reductions. While the spouse’s own worker benefit can receive DRCs if the
benefit is postponed after FRA, her spousal benefit does not receive these
credits. This clause in the Social Security rules, more fully explained below,
is used to create a disincentive to delay receipt of benefits.
Under the old rules, Social Security policy prevented a wife from taking
benefits based on her husband’s primary worker benefit until he (the
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primary worker) became ‘entitled.’ Although a worker might be eligible for
full retirement benefits, say at age 66, he was not entitled until he filed for
these benefits. And the spouse did not become entitled to the spousal benefits
until the worker filed for those benefits. Therefore, since a spousal benefit
did not receive DRCs and the spouse could only take those benefits once
the worker files, it became clear that the value of delaying Social Security for
a married couple was reduced if the worker is delaying Social Security
and the spouse is eligible for benefits but not receiving them. The spouse
would not receive any DRCs, and therefore ‘left money on the table,’ if she
continued to wait to start her benefits. Jennings and Reichenstein (2001)
incorporated this into their present value calculations for Social Security
options.
Recent changes to Social Security, however, have changed the dynamics
of these outcomes and what married couples should now consider. In par-
ticular, the Senior Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act of 2000 allowed seniors
to ‘file and suspend’ their benefits upon reaching FRA, which enables the
benefits of a worker to continue to accrue DRCs.1 This ability to ‘file and
suspend’ benefits is an option whether or not the primary worker is still
working. Most importantly, it also allows the spouse to take Social Security
benefits based on her spousal benefits even when her husband continues to
delay his own benefit and receive DRCs. Thus, the disincentive to delay the
primary worker’s benefit due to spousal benefit concerns described above
now impacts a much smaller percentage of beneficiaries, those cases where
the spouse is older than the worker and eligible for spousal benefits.
Accordingly, the value of delaying Social Security for a primary worker
(and eventually a potential widow) improved, since most of the time spousal
benefits are not forfeited if the spouse is otherwise eligible to receive
benefits. The Senior Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act of 2000 provides more
choice for the retirees and the decision on whether to collect Social Secu-
rity benefits now becomes a separate one for the worker and the spouse in
a married couple. It is critical that retirees and advisers understand these
choices and their value if they are to make informed decisions to maximize
the Social Security benefits available to them.
Given this flexibility, we have identified three primary strategies for cou-
ples when delaying Social Security. It is often in a couple’s best interest to
delay the primary benefit as late as possible, due to the fact that the benefit
is passed on to the surviving spouse. The three options revolve around
when the spouse takes her own worker’s benefit. Scenario I involves the
spouse starting benefits as early as possible. Under Scenario II, the spouse
delays starting benefits until her FRA. With Scenario III, the spouse delays
her benefits until age 70. While the full menu of options involve every
month of age in between, these three key ages are chosen due to the change
in the calculation of the timing of benefits formula that occurs at FRA.
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Under all three scenarios, the primary worker will file and suspend upon
reaching his FRA. Any benefit that the spouse is entitled to off the primary’s
record (the ‘spousal benefit’) will start at that time unless otherwise stated.
This new ability for the spouse to take spousal benefits at an earlier age
is valuable because the lower (spousal) benefit will drop off once one of
the married individuals dies. And, more importantly, the higher, delayed
Social Security benefit is now ‘stepped up to’ by the widow and there-
fore can provide much higher survivor income protection. This especially
holds true when a spouse is younger than the worker, as the younger
the spouse (widow) is, the higher the present value of her projected
benefits.
Table 7-2 identifies the actuarial present value of Social Security benefits
for a married couple and compares beginning Social Security early at
age 62 versus the three scenarios just described. For the purposes of this
paper, the actuarial present value is defined as the survivorship-adjusted
net present value of the cash flows. Cash flows are first multiplied by the
probability of survival as determined by the 1994 Group Annuity Rates
Mortality Table (GAR) and then discounted by the rate discussed below.
The 1994 GAR table is chosen because it is designed to represent the
mortality of those sufficiently healthy to work at the time the table is used.
The primary worker is assumed to be entitled to an age 62 benefit of $1,414
per month. The three examples are based on the spouse being entitled to
(a) no worker benefit on her own but a spousal benefit on the primary’s
record, (b) a $300 monthly worker benefit at age 62 and a smaller spousal
benefit on the primary’s record, and (c) a $1,000 monthly worker benefit
at age 62 and no spousal benefit. For a discount rate, we chose to use
the 15-year US treasury rate as of mid-January, 2007, the time all of the
comparable market numbers were run. That rate was 4.9622 percent. Since
Social Security is an obligation of the government, it is most appropriately
discounted by the rate for other government securities.
It is helpful to break the Social Security decision into component parts.
The first column of Table 7-2 calculates the actuarial value of the pre-
tax cash flows for the primary worker (and surviving spouse conditional
on the primary being the first death) if the worker elects to receive the
benefits exactly at 62. The second column calculates the same value as of
age 62 should the worker elect to delay the receipt of the benefits until
age 70. The third through sixth columns relate to the decision around
taking the spouse’s benefits. Column 3 values the spousal benefit (and
the spouse’s worker benefit, if any) should the spouse elect to take ben-
efits as early as possible. Column 4 (Scenario I) portrays the value to the
spouse should she take benefits early while the primary delays. Remem-
ber, if the primary is delaying the benefit, the spousal piece collected off
the primary’s benefit cannot be collected until the primary reaches FRA.
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Columns 5 and 6 value the decision to take benefits under Scenarios II and
III listed above.
As shown in Table 7-2, delaying the primary benefit until age 70 repre-
sents a greater present value option assuming a 4.9622 percent net interest
rate and the 1994 GAR relative to taking the primary benefit early. In
valuing the primary benefit, we used the probabilities that one member
of the couple would still be alive to collect the higher, delayed benefit. This
methodology is used because a surviving spouse may collect the primary’s
delayed benefit in the future if she is living and the primary worker has
died. Choosing to delay the spouse’s own worker benefits is a negative
present value proposition because the formula for delaying is not actu-
arially equivalent for the spouse when one factors in the fact that both
members of the couple must be alive in order for the spouse’s benefit to
be collected. This is illustrated from the $1,000 spouse’s worker benefit
[Example (c)] as one moves from Scenario I (starting the spouse’s worker
benefit at age 62) versus Scenario II (beginning the spouse’s worker benefit
at age 66). Conversely, the higher penalty for taking the spousal benefit
on the primary record early makes the choice to delay receipt until FRA
a positive one under these assumptions. This is shown through ‘Example
(a),’ where the spouse has only a spousal benefit and no worker benefit of
her own. The PV of taking the spousal piece at FRA (which is the earliestAu: Please
provide the
expanded form
of PV if it is
deemed
necessary.
possible decision should the primary delay benefits) is higher than the PV
of taking the spousal piece early. Thus, unless a couple has reason to believe
their expected longevity is materially different than the longevity implied
by the 1994 GAR table, Scenario I provides the best value. These figures do
not include the effects of taxes and they also place no value on the peace
of mind that comes from a higher guaranteed income level that will survive
as long as one member is alive.
Additional Factors in the Take-Up Decision
Tax Treatment of Social Security Benefits
Social Security income is often much more tax efficient than IRA income
under current tax law. In fact, we believe that the tax benefits of Social Secu-
rity have been greatly underappreciated. Marginal tax rates may be much
higher after retirement, as noted by Gokhale et al. (2001) and Gokhale
and Kotlikoff (2003). Prior research such as Jennings and Reichenstein
(2001) makes the assumption that Social Security income earned over the
Combined Income thresholds will cause Social Security to be taxed at a rate
of up to 85 percent of the benefits paid and that the source of income does
not matter. Actually, this assumption will not necessarily hold true for the
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majority of individuals and mandates a closer look, especially in light of the
question of when to initiate Social Security benefits.
The rules outlining the taxation of Social Security benefits can be found
under section 126 of the Official Social Security Handbook [Social Secu-
rity Administration (SSA) 2001]. A brief description is of use here. Law
changes enacted in 1983 and later in 1993 provide that Social Security
benefits received over certain thresholds of Combined Income are subject
to taxation up to ¢85 of a Social Security dollar. The thresholds were
determined in 1983 with the idea that only the wealthy would pay taxes on
their Social Security benefits. After the first threshold, up to 50 percent of
Social Security income is subject to taxation. After the second threshold,
up to 85 percent of Social Security income is subject to taxation. The
thresholds were not indexed for inflation, and currently as of 2007 stand
at $32,000/$44,000 for married couples, and $25,000/$34,000 for single
individuals. The threshold for 50 percent taxation was established effective
for 1983, the 85 percent for 1994.
The Combined Income formula includes all of a retiree’s income exclud-
ing Roth income together with 50 percent of their Social Security income.
The amount of Social Security that is taxable is the minimum of three tests:
50 percent of the Combined Income amount over the first threshold plus
35 percent of Combined Income over the second threshold, or 50 percent
of benefits plus 85 percent of Combined Income over the second threshold,
or 85 percent of benefits. Combined Income counts all of the income
that is normally taxable plus tax-free municipal bond income. Therefore
a married couple which has saved diligently within a 401(k) can face a
very high marginal tax rate on an additional dollar of IRA income. If the
spouses are in a 25 percent tax bracket, they may pay ¢25 on the IRA dollar
as ordinary income tax and another ¢21.25 on the Social Security dollar
now subject to taxation at 85 percent ($1 × .85 × 25 percent). The effective
marginal tax rate on that dollar is therefore 46.25 percent. When current
tax rates increase under the sunset provisions scheduled under current law,
the effective rate will increase even higher and will exceed 50 percent. State
taxes can push the marginal tax rate even higher.
Some financial journalists have dubbed this concept the ‘tax torpedo.’
But just as the tax torpedo can accelerate the taxes due on a retirement
income strategy, trading IRA income for Social Security income can create
a reverse tax torpedo and drastically reduce taxes. Commonly, a retiree will
take Social Security early at age 62 and fund his remaining income needs
with IRA withdrawals (which represent his qualified retirement savings).
Many of these retirees will find themselves hit by the tax torpedo. Contrast,
however, that an individual who delays taking Social Security and funds his
needs out of his IRA or other qualified plan is, in essence, trading IRA
income for higher Social Security income. This can provide distinct and
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measurable tax advantages. In lieu of just assuming that 85 percent of Social
Security income will become taxable, it is important to recognize what type
of income is being received. Since Social Security income only counts at a
50 percent rate into the Combined Income formula, much larger amounts
of Social Security can be received before the Combined Income thresholds
are met. Therefore, when trading an IRA dollar of income for a Social
Security dollar, not only is the IRA dollar no longer present (and thus no
tax is due), but less Social Security income is also subject to taxation.
A quick illustration is as follows: assume an IRA dollar is removed from
the income pool and is added back in the form of Social Security. Remov-
ing the IRA dollar causes the Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) to reduce
by one dollar. AGI is income including wages, interest, capital gains, and
income from retirement accounts adjusted downward by specific deduc-
tions (including contributions to deductible retirement accounts), but
not including standard and itemized deductions. The IRA dollar being
removed also causes Combined Income to drop by a dollar. The Social
Security dollar that is added back counts only half to Combined Income,
netting a ¢50 decrease in the Combined Income amount. If, for example,
we assume that the Combined Income amount is already over the second
threshold, that ¢50 decrease results in an additional ¢42.5 reduction to
AGI. This results in a total AGI reduction of $1.425. The total gross income
has not changed, but AGI is reduced by $1.425.
In a 25 percent bracket, this saves $0.35625 in federal taxes on that
dollar of income. If the beneficiary’s state of residence also taxes Social
Security, it functions the exact same way, albeit just with different tax rates.
If the state does not tax Social Security, the lower IRA income still reduces
state taxes. Of course, when enough dollars are shifted to Social Security
(from an IRA), the retiree may slide into a marginal tax bracket lower than
25 percent. Therefore, additional retirement income such as Required
Minimum Distribution amounts may also benefit from lower tax rates. Of
course, additional income could be subject to the ‘tax torpedo’ as well.
Table 7-3 shows an example with $69,000 of pretax income. For a retired
married couple both aged 72, having Social Security income of $24,000 plus
IRA income of $45,000 results in AGI of $62,050. Conversely, the couple
who delays Social Security and has Social Security income of $39,000 with
a lower IRA income of $30,000 has the same pretax income of $69,000
but an AGI of only $40,675. The first couple has $21,375 more in AGI—
52.5 percent higher and spends $3,206.25 more in federal income taxes
alone for 2006. This same inefficiency occurs every year throughout their
retirement once the higher Social Security benefits have started. That totals
almost $100,000 in additional federal taxes over 30 years.
For a retiring individual with only 401(k) wealth (likely to be rolled into
an IRA) and Social Security, to be able to afford delaying Social Security
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Table 7-3 Tax Efficiency from Alternative Social Security Claiming
Strategies ($2006)
Strategy I Strategy II
Social Security income 24,000 39,000
IRA yearly withdrawal 45,000 30,000
Other taxable income 0 0
Sum of income from all sources 69,000 69,000
Combined income 57,000 49,500
50% excess over 1st threshold +35% excess
over 2nd
17,050 10,675
85% of benefits 20,400 33,150
50% of benefits +85% excess over 2nd
threshold
23,050 24,175
Adjusted Gross Income (minimum of
Combined Income Tests + IRA Income)
62,050 40,675
Federal taxes 6,060 2,854
State taxes 2,891 1,895
Other nontaxable income 0 0
Total after-tax income 61,703 65,321
Source: Authors’ computations.
Note: This table indicates the tax efficiency of delaying Social Security once
that higher income stream begins. The two columns compare taking the
same amount of pretax income ($69,000) for a 72-year-old man with different
amounts of Social Security and IRA income. The column on the right has a
strategy that takes $15,000 more in Social Security income and $15,000 less in
IRA income than the column on the left. As the right-hand column indicates,
Adjusted Gross Income is reduced by approximately one third compared to
the left-hand column because there is less IRA income and surprisingly, much
lower taxable Social Security. State taxes are assumed to be 4.66%.
income, IRA income would need to be taken from the retiree’s retirement
date until the delayed Social Security start age. We will refer to this time
period as the ‘Bridge Period’ and individuals will be receiving ‘Bridge
Income’ from their IRA during this period. Although this IRA income
is fully taxable as ordinary income and conventional wisdom holds that
tax-deferred income is best delayed as long as possible, the benefits from
delaying Social Security are often much greater. Many retirees will pay
slightly higher taxes during the Bridge Period, but experience thousands of
dollars in annual savings from the point that higher Social Security income
begins. By decoupling when to take the majority of IRA income from the
time one takes the majority of their Social Security income, much greater
tax efficiency can be achieved.
Taken to an extreme, if a person were to convert all of his income
into Social Security income, he would pay no taxes on the income. Social
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Security, as a sole source of income, is tax-free up to $113,058 for 2006
for a married couple with the standard income tax deductions. (This
number is indexed with inflation and tied to the tax brackets.) Thereafter
for the next $28,000 of Social Security income, the marginal tax rate of
another Social Security dollar is 4.25 percent. In reality, with the earnings
cap, nobody can receive that much from Social Security. Two high-income
earners who delayed to age 70 could total ∼$60,000 in benefits in today’s
dollars.
As a planning strategy, however, pre-retirees could project their future
Social Security benefits at age 70 and assume lower taxes will be paid on
their income. Due to the wage indexing of Social Security benefits, many
retirees will retire with significant Social Security benefits. Often, these
benefits can be turned into tax-free income at age 70. Let us consider
a higher than average earning dual income couple, both aged 55 and
earning $75,000 a year. We assume the couple wants to retire at age 62. The
Social Security Web site shows a future value of $20,400 for each worker if
collecting at age 62, for a total of $40,800 for the couple. However, if the
couple, while still retiring at age 62, waits to begin Social Security benefits
until age 70, those benefits are projected to be ∼$44,500 per person for
a total of $89,000 of income beginning at age 70 eight years later. If they
had no other income, the entire $89,000 of Social Security income would
escape federal and state taxation.
As the Combined Income thresholds are not indexed for inflation, more
and more individuals will be subject to the tax torpedo and therefore would
benefit from this strategy. Munnell (2003) and others have discussed the
increased taxation of Social Security benefits that is occurring over time, as
individuals will be more likely to have income over these non-indexed Com-
bined Income thresholds. The higher taxation can often be avoided when
higher Social Security benefits are elected and IRA income is minimized.
At very high amounts of other income, the tax benefits of trading for more
Social Security dollars become limited to the ¢15 of every Social Security
dollar that is always sheltered from taxes. Thus, there are always some tax
benefits to this strategy, no matter what the income level is. Although it is
not intuitive due to the lower Social Security taxation thresholds (starting
at $25,000 and $32,000), our research shows that retirees receiving up to
$90,000 per year in after-tax income can see significant tax savings once
higher, delayed Social Security benefits begin.
When considering the after-tax dollars actually available for the retire-
ment lifestyle, the break-even age for comparing early Social Security versus
delayed Social Security is often lowered to somewhere between 75 and
76 years old. The actual age varies depending on the tax situation of
the individual. It is important to note that the tax advantages created by
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delaying Social Security may be even more advantageous for a married
couple after the death of the primary worker. Note that the surviving
spouse will be in a single tax bracket and have a lower Combined Income
threshold. With a strategy of ‘early Social Security’ and IRA withdrawals, the
widow will likely see taxation of the IRA and much of her Social Security
income. By evoking a strategy at the beginning of retirement of taking
IRA income first and a higher delayed Social Security amount, a widow
may see much lower taxes since most of the income is in the form of
Social Security via the higher Survivor Benefit. And thus, as mentioned
above, that income is treated more favorably and will likely see the Social
Security taxation formula pick up the test which calculates 50 percent of
the Combined Income amount over the first threshold plus 35 percent
of Combined Income over the second threshold. Consider, a widow could
have $50,000 of Social Security income (counting as $25,000) before hitting
that first threshold for a single individual.
As mentioned above, many financial advisers advocate taking Social Secu-
rity early and invoke a strategy to manage IRA withdrawals. Since longevity
and investment risks are not often pooled via annuitization, a larger nest
egg is needed to self-insure against these postretirement risks when addi-
tional income is needed above and beyond an ‘early’ Social Security benefit
amount. Furthermore, expenses must be considered.
The Expense Advantage of Social Security
The ‘safe withdrawal rate’ initially introduced by Bengen (1994) uses
Monte Carlo simulation of historical returns to predict the probability
of successfully providing an income stream over a 20-, 30-, or 40-year
retirement horizon. Unfortunately, investment expenses and fees are
often ignored in this discussion. Pye (2001) concluded that investment
expenses can have a profound impact on withdrawal rates. Since individ-
uals increasingly bear the burden of providing income throughout retire-
ment, expenses drained from a portfolio also will reduce future retirement
income and thus have emerged as a risk to retirement security. Pye found
that the safe withdrawal rate must be reduced by ratio of the expense rate
divided by the expected rate of return of the portfolio. Therefore, a 30-year
‘safe withdrawal rate’ of 4 percent, which assumed a 7 percent average gross
return with 2.5 percent expenses, would have to be reduced by 35.7 percent
to 2.57 percent [1 − (.025/.07) × .04]. In this example, over 35 percent of
potential income is going to pay for expenses, yet many individuals appear
not to be factoring in these expenses when calculating a safe withdrawal
rate.
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In Maxey (2005), Lipper reported that the average expense ratio of
equity funds had risen to 1.56 percent. In addition, Karcinski, Livingston,
and O’Neal (2004) found that the average equity mutual fund has an
additional 96 basis points of hidden fees made up of brokerage costs and
trading costs. Some retirees also pay up-front commissions to purchase
mutual funds, while many others pay an asset-under-management fee of 1–
1.5 percent to a financial adviser/planner. Therefore, total annual expenses
for a retiree to hire professional assistance in a ‘Do-It-Yourself’ retirement
world can easily amount to 3 percent or more.
By trading IRA income for higher, delayed Social Security income, a
retiree transitions the expenses of managing his assets to the government.
Although an individual has paid FICA taxes during his or her workingAu: Please
provide the full
form of FICA
here if it is
deemed
necessary.
years, there is no additional cost based on the size of the chosen Social
Security benefit. We assume a retiree elects delayed Social Security and
receives $20,000 (adjusted annually for inflation) more of income from
age 70 on. If the retiree had elected the lower Social Security amount
($20,000 less), a comparable safe withdrawal rate of 5 percent for the next
20 years may provide a high probability of income being provided for the
full duration under a 60/30/10 stock/bond/cash split. Therefore, with no
expenses, a lump sum amount of $400,000 could provide the 5 percent
withdrawal of $20,000, which is income above and beyond the (early) Social
Security benefit. However, once fees are brought in, the size of the lump
sum needed grows tremendously. If one assumes 2.5 percent of expenses
and an assumed 7 percent gross return, the safe 5 percent withdrawal
amount is lowered to 3.215 percent [1 − (.025/.07) × .05]. Therefore, to
provide $20,000 of income, the lump sum amount grows from $400,000 to
$622,083. This is a much more expensive strategy as evidenced that in the
first year alone, $20,000 of income is provided but also expenses of $15,552
(2.5 percent × $622,083) are generated.
By delaying Social Security, the individual no longer bears the costs of
providing that additional income. Since Social Security is ‘expense free’
during retirement, more dollars can be received by a retiree and not used
to pay for investment/financial expertise.
Social Security Options and Customization Are Available
As defined contribution plans replace defined benefit plans, the role of
the traditional Social Security benefit as an annuity will become relatively
more important. Many retiring Americans will have a much greater fraction
of wealth tied up in Social Security than from their own private retire-
ment savings. Consider that a married high earner in 2006 would retire
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with over $25,000 of Social Security income between the worker and the
nonworking spouse if they started collecting right away at age 62. Even
assuming no fees, ignoring the tax efficiency, and assuming a 4 percent safe
withdrawal rate, that couple would need $625,000 of saving just to provide
a similar pretax benefit with 90 percent confidence that income will last
30 years.
Individuals have the ability to start different pieces of Social Security at
different times. A working spouse could start her own worker benefits at
age 62, add the additional spousal benefit when her husband reaches FRA,
and then eventually assume an even higher widow’s benefit at the death of
her spouse. Another additional strategy can be used to maximize spousal
benefits when the primary earning spouse is delaying Social Security as
long as the lower earning spouse has already filed for benefits based on
her work record. As Ruffenach (2007) noted, under this strategy, once
the primary worker attains FRA, he files only for spousal benefits. He
would be entitled to spousal benefits for the four-year period from age
66 to age 70. At age 70, once the higher benefit is claimed based on
his own earnings history, the spousal benefits being paid to him would
cease.
This tactic is unique since historically, the higher earning spouse may
not have been thinking about claiming spousal benefits. The key to under-
standing this option is based on the earlier mention of the difference
between being ‘eligible’ for a Social Security benefit and being ‘entitled.’
For example, an individual may be ‘eligible’ for full retirement benefits at
age 66. But he only becomes ‘entitled’ to those benefits once he has filed
for those benefits.
Accordingly, if an individual does not file for his Social Security benefits
based on his own earnings, he is not ‘entitled’ to those earnings. Therefore,
he may become ‘entitled’ to spousal benefits once he files for them (if his
spouse has filed for benefits based on her work record and he is past FRA)
since he is not yet ‘entitled’ to benefits based on his own work record. Prior
to the FRA, an application for a spousal benefit is deemed to also be an
application for the worker benefit. This is no longer the case once FRA
is reached. Although these additional spousal benefits would add to the
present value of Social Security benefits for those delaying Social Security,
the figures in this chapter do not reflect these values.
Once individuals customize a strategy to optimize their potential Social
Security benefits, they can structure an IRA strategy to provide income
during the Bridge Period from retirement to the delayed Social Security
date of the primary worker. For a married couple who started the spouse’s
Social Security benefit earlier, this income could be ‘carved out’ of the IRA
income needed.
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The Benefits of Delaying Social Security
and Taking Bridge Income
Thus far we have explained the inflation benefits, tax benefits, expense
benefits, and survivor benefits of delaying Social Security. Further, we have
introduced the concept of decoupling IRA and Social Security income by
drawing on IRA assets first during a Bridge Period to higher, delayed Social
Security. In this section, we explore this strategy in more depth. Specifically,
we assume that the Bridge Income is in the form of a period-certain annuity
constructed to provide a steady stream of nominal income on an after-tax
basis to the retirees. A period-certain annuity is an immediate annuity term
vehicle that pays monthly income for a specified period. Once that period
has expired, no further value exists in the annuity. Since the money has
been rolled out of a qualified plan, the period-certain annuity is in the form
of an IRA. Thus, all income is taxable when payments are received by the
individual. The annuity will provide 3 percent annual increases to provide
for some inflation protection during the Bridge Period. The annuity will
be reduced proportionately for the married couple as the spouse begins
to receive Social Security benefits. For the annuity, we used a 5 percent
nominal interest rate, assumed typical annuity administrative expenses,
and an assumed 4 percent distribution cost. Other investment vehicles
could also be utilized during the Bridge Period including laddering CDs
or bonds, as well as using an invested portfolio of assets. Below, we present
the annuity due to the ability to customize exact cash flows.
Three different cases are presented. The first two cases reflect single
workers, George and Marianne. Both are relatively high-income earners
and are projected to receive $1,414 a month in Social Security benefits if
they start at age 62. Since Social Security does not make any distinctions by
sex, their benefits and taxes are identical; only their projected longevity is
different. The third example is of a married couple, whom we will refer to
as John and Linda, both assumed to be aged 62. Similar to Table 7-2 above,
we examine various levels of spouse Social Security income for this general
case.
In the first example, George has $247,000 of 401(k) assets which he is
considering rolling over to an IRA. He wishes to retire at age 62, at which
point he can begin collecting a pension benefit of $3,000 per month. (Note
that the $3,000 pension income could be $3,000 of IRA withdrawals as both
are taxed the same at the federal level). George considers taking Social
Security at 62 and funding the remaining income he needs to live on by
taking IRA withdrawals. Alternatively, he can take IRA income first during
the Bridge Period and delay Social Security to age 70. He thus benefits
from not taking the Social Security reduction, accumulating DRCs, and
benefits from the intervening COLAs. By delaying Social Security, George
978–0–19–954910–8 07-Ameriks-c07 OUP239-Ameriks (Typeset by SPI, Delhi) 161 of 167 February 29, 2008 17:3
7 / New Approaches to Retirement Income Phasing 161
can plan on much higher Social Security income versus IRA income during
a retirement expected to last many years. Conversely, by taking early Social
Security, George has higher IRA income. We make the same financial
assumptions for Marianne, the single female.
To compare the two financial strategies, we develop a methodology that
would match incomes on an after-tax basis. In this example for single
retirees, George or Marianne will be providing themselves with $58,000
of inflation-adjusted net after-tax income for the rest of their lives. Our
methodology is as follows:
 Project Social Security Benefits to age 100, assuming both take the
benefits early versus at age 70. The projected COLAs in the 2006
Annual Social Security Trustees report are used to adjust the benefits
annually.
 Project Tax Brackets using 2006 tax brackets and standard deductions
for single individuals out to the year 2044, taking into account the
current sunset provisions in the tax law. For state taxes, a flat rate is
assumed (4.66 percent for married, 5.19 percent for single) and taxes
are calculated as a percentage of AGI.
 Calculate the Cost of the Bridge Income during the Bridge Period
under the delayed approach. Using these assumptions and the
assumed pension income, we calculate the after-tax benefit of starting
Social Security at age 70. We then discount that after-tax amount back
to age 62 for inflation using a 3 percent step rate. Next, we solve for
the gross income that would need to be taken from the IRA assets to
generate that level of after-tax income. Then we price the eight-year
period-certain annuity using the initial income level calculated in c and
increasing the payment by 3 percent to reflect Cost of Living increases.
Last, we calculate the projected after-tax income for every year until
age 100.
 Calculate the required IRA withdrawals that would need to be made
under the early Social Security approach to match the after-tax income
of the delayed approach for every year until age 100. IRA assets are
presumed to grow at a 5.78 percent nominal rate (see Appendix
Table 7-A1).
Once the cash flows are determined, we can then compare the two
approaches.
The single premium annuity to provide the Bridge Income utilizes almost
the entire $247,000 IRA balance. This can be viewed as the cost of ‘pur-
chasing’ the income during the Bridge Period to affect this strategy. This
is the number we use as the basis of our comparisons going forward. We
then calculate present values of the income up until various points. In
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Table 7-4 Present Value of Required Income ($): Single and Married Cases
Social Security Claim Single
Marianne
George Married
John and Linda
Total after-tax income 58,000 58,000 68,000
Annual IRA withdrawals
(non-delayed)
15,149 15,149 18,135
Delayed to 70 Cost of bridge income
period-certain annuity
246,636 246,636 276,648
Early at 62 Until life expectancy 286,454 259,819 381,931
Early at 62 75% life expectancy 335,199 311,553 419,113
Early at 62 90% life expectancy 364,601 350,194 453,453
Early at 62 Cost of inflation-protected
annuity
304,064 276,266 409,635
Early at 62 Pye Safe Withdrawal
Approach
451,424 451,424 540,414
Source: Authors’ computations.
Note: Values calculated as of December 2006/January 2007. IRA assets accumulate at a 5.78%
rate. This table compares costs of two strategies. The first involves delaying Social Security of
the primary worker until age 70 while taking IRA income first during a Bridge Period from
retirement until delayed Social Security begins. This is compared to a second strategy which
starts Social Security at age 62 and couples that income with IRA income beginning at the
same time. To provide the same after-tax income until life expectancy as the first approach
via IRA withdrawals (in addition to the ‘early’ Social Security), the present value of the
needed IRA is indicated. Similar values are provided if the individuals wanted to ensure the
same after-tax income until the 75th and 90th percentiles of life expectancy. In addition, if
the IRA was invested in an inflation-adjusted annuity, the cost is provided as of January 2007.
Finally, we calculate the cost if the IRA utilized a safe withdrawal strategy of an initial 4%
and thereafter increasing for inflation while incorporating Pye’s methodology of properly
accounting for investment expenses. Pye’s methodology utilizes 4% Safe Withdrawal Rate
with a 60/30/10 stock mutual fund/bond mutual fund/cash mix. Expenses are assumed to
be 150 bp for stock mutual fund, 75 bps for bond fund, zero for cash. Expected gross return
is 7.10%.
calculating the value of this approach, we use income up to the assumed life
expectancies similar to Jennings and Reichenstein (2001); this approach
is superior to calculating a pure actuarial value, since actuarial values do
not adequately reflect the risks an individual faces. An individual is either
alive or not and thus is required to provide himself with the full amount
of necessary income, or none at all. (Life expectancies can be found in
Appendix Table 7-A1.) Results are shown in Table 7-4.
Using the 1994 Group Annuity Rate mortality table, Marianne has a life
expectancy of 87, and George has a life expectancy of 84. We also present
values at the 75th and 90th percentiles of longevity. This is important
as one of the largest risks that retirees face is living a longer life than
they perhaps expect and thus risk running out of an adequate amount of
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income. Financial plans that focus only on life expectancy have a 50 per-
cent chance of falling short. The present value is calculated using the
same 4.9622 percent net interest rate utilized earlier. It is much more
expensive for Marianne, on an expected value basis, to finance her after-
tax income needed by electing early Social Security at age 62 and taking
IRA withdrawals. The IRA balance runs out quickly as the retiree must
not only pay higher taxes but also must provide the ‘foregone COLAs’
(the difference between COLA awards between the early Social Security
and delayed Social Security amounts) out of her IRA. For George, the
values are not quite as large, but the approach is still more efficient. These
projections do not account for the risks of investing for retirement on one’s
own including poor mutual fund selection, greater than projected fund
expenses, and the effects of reverse dollar cost averaging. This analysis also
sets aside investment risk—the probability of running out of money is much
higher under these assumptions (effectively a 6.16 percent withdrawal rate)
than under the safe withdrawal rates calculated by Pye (2001). Recall that
under Pye’s methodology, the safe withdrawal rate must be reduced by
the annual expenses divided by the expected return. Thus, with the safe
withdrawal rate driven down by expenses, the size of the required nest
egg must increase substantially. Using the assumed returns and expenses
utilizing Pye’s methodology, one would need a little over $451,000 to have
90 percent confidence that George or Marianne could make the necessary
withdrawals until age 92.
A better alternative to Pye’s approach may be to purchase an inflation-
protected annuity from a financial services company to provide desired
income above and beyond this reduced, early Social Security benefit. This is
the closest comparable financial product to the delayed Social Security plus
Bridge Income approach. An initial income level of $1,262 a month would
need to be purchased to roughly approximate the cash flow required.
A quote received on January 23, 2007, was $276,265 for George and
$304,063 for Marianne for inflation-protected, life-only income annuities
(www.flagship.vanguard.com). Thus, to provide themselves with most of the
protections and income that following the delayed Social Security approach
would bring, George would need 12 percent ($30,000) more in assets, and
Marianne would need over 23 percent ($58,000) more.
The benefits are also substantial for the married couple, John and Linda.
We assume they have $277,000 in assets and a $3,000 a month Joint and
100 percent Survivor pension. We assume that John has a monthly Social
Security benefit of $1,414 if he starts at age 62. Rather than examine all
possible Social Security scenarios for the couple, we assume that Linda
has a small worker’s benefit of $300 per month and would be eligible to
collect a spousal benefit based on John’s work record as well. Scenario I has
Linda starting her $300 per month benefit immediately at age 62 and then
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collecting an additional $586 (today’s dollars) spousal benefit starting at
age 66. This is deliberately the most complex situation, to illustrate a prac-
tical application of the various components of the Social Security decision.
We follow the same procedures as used in the single example, but substitute
the married tax brackets and standard deductions. Again, the annuity
increases at a 3 percent rate to mimic Social Security annual increases but
is reduced proportionately when spousal Social Security begins. Essentially,
the spousal Social Security income is carved out of the annuity cash flow.
In calculating the value of the approach, we use the cash flows calculated
for a married couple until the joint first to die age, and then we use the
cash flows calculated for a single individual until the joint last to die age.
John and Linda’s total after-tax real income approximates $68,000 per year
in retirement.
Results appear in Table 7-4. For our married couple, the benefits of
following a delayed Social Security approach are significant. To provide
the same level ($68,000 after-tax) of income, John and Linda would need
anywhere from $67,000 to $265,000 more in assets, depending on the
methodology chosen and the certainty level desired. John and Linda would
need additional outside income of ∼$1,511 per month to have the same
level of after-tax income that a delayed Social Security strategy would pro-
vide. This amount would drop by ∼5 percent upon the first death, thus
it approximately equates to a Joint and 95 percent survivor annuity with
inflation adjustments. While not illustrated here, if Linda had no worker’s
benefit, the required cash flow would drop a bit more, equating to a Joint
and 85 percent benefit.
While not portrayed in these examples, we note that for two income
households, delaying both the spouse and the primary’s worker benefits
can result in very significant tax savings. Retirees should consider the ben-
efits in light of both partners’ health and projected longevity to determine
if it is worth delaying both. It is also useful to note that we only consider
income motives in this chapter. The primary disadvantage of the delayed
Social Security plus Bridge Income strategy is the fast spend-down of assets
during the Bridge Period. While significant tax advantages and efficiencies
exist, retirees need to live into their mid-70s or early 80s in order to truly
benefit from the strategy relative to an early Social Security plus drawdown
approach.
Conclusion
Our research shows that individuals should not just look at traditional
‘break-even’ points when evaluating when to begin Social Security retire-
ment benefits. Instead, optimizing their potential Social Security payments
over the next several decades can provide retirees with significant financial
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peace of mind. In particular, Social Security has undergone significant
changes that make the value of delaying the receipt of Social Security bene-
fits greater than in the past. Specifically, the increase in the FRA and DRCs
can result in significantly greater benefits from delaying Social Security.
The tax efficiency of Social Security income and the ‘tax torpedo’ penal-
ization of taking qualified retirement income serve to magnify these ben-
efits. In the future, greater numbers of spouses will become eligible for
their own worker benefits, but they should consider how those benefits
integrate with their spouse’s benefits to provide optimal survivor income
protection. Additionally, changes made under the Senior Citizens’ Free-
dom to Work Act of 2000 make delaying Social Security for the worker
(the higher earning Social Security beneficiary within a married couple)
even more attractive. With the additional benefits of survivor protection,
inflation adjustments, low expenses, and customization options available,
delaying Social Security (for at least one member of a retiring couple)
and taking income from personal retirement savings during the Bridge
Period becomes a very efficient strategy of providing retirement income.
Conversely, the rates of return required to be generated by personal savings
accounts such as IRAs and 401(k)s to pay for the additional taxes and
expenses when choosing to take Social Security early exceed what many aca-
demics and professionals are projecting today. In sum, reasonably healthy
individuals and couples may wish to take seriously the potential benefits of
delaying Social Security, and first providing themselves with income from
their qualified retirement saving.
Appendix
Table 7-A1 Life Expectancy Ages
Marianne George Married
(first to die)
Married
(last to die)
Life expectancy 87 84 80 91
75% expectancy 93 90 86 95
90% expectancy 97 95 90 99
Source: Society of Actuaries (1995).
Note
1 Since this information is not widely known, interested readers may secure more
information in the Social Security Program Operations Manual System §§GN 02409.100
and GN 02409.110 [Social Security Administration (SSA) 2007].
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